
HybrIDX: New Hybrid Index for Volume-hiding
Range Queries in Data Outsourcing Services
Kui Ren
‡
,YuGuo
†
, Jiaqi Li
‡
, Xiaohua Jia
†
, Cong Wang
†
, Yajin Zhou
‡
, Sheng Wang
§
, Ning Cao
£
, Feifei Li
§
‡
Zhejiang University,
†
City University of Hong Kong,
§
Alibaba Group,
£
Hangzhou Mishu Technology.
{kuiren, lijiaqi93, yajin
zhou}@zju.edu.cn, y.guo@my.cityu.edu.hk, {congwang, csjia}@cityu.edu.hk,
{sh.wang, lifeifei}@alibaba-inc.com, ncao@hzmstech.com
Abstract—An encrypted index is a data structure that assisting
untrusted servers to provide various query functionalities in the
ciphertext domain. Although traditional index designs can pre-
vent servers from directly obtaining plaintexts, the confidentiality
of outsourced data could still be compromised by observing
the volume of different queries. Recent volume attacks have
demonstrated the importance of sealing volume-pattern leakage.
To this end, several works are made to design secure indexes with
the volume-hiding property. However, prior designs only work
for encrypted keyword search. Due to the unpredictable range
query results, it is difficult to protect the volume-pattern leakage
while achieving efficient range queries.
In this paper, for the first time, we define and solve the chal-
lenging problem of volume-hiding range queries over encrypted
data. Our proposed hybrid index framework, called HybrIDX,
allows an untrusted server to efficiently search encrypted data
based on order conditions without revealing the exact volume size.
It resorts to the trusted hardware techniques to assist range query
processing by moving the comparison algorithm to trusted SGX
enclaves. To enable volume-hiding data retrieval, we propose to
host encrypted results outside the enclave in an encrypted multi-
maps manner. Apart from this novel hybrid index design, we
further customize a bulk refresh mechanism to enable access-
pattern obfuscation. We formally analyze the security strengths
and complete the prototype implementation. Evaluation results
demonstrate the feasibility and practicability of our designs.
I. INTRODUCTION
An encrypted index offers a secure interface for data owners
to outsource private data to an untrusted server, while se-
lectively retrieving data without server-side decryption. It is
recognized as a fundamental component of building privacy-
preserving applications. Early studies on secure index con-
struction mainly focus on the direction of keyword search [1]–
[7]. Along with the development of data outsourcing paradigm,
enabling efficient range queries over secure indexes has at-
tracted a lot of attention from both academia and industry [8]–
[12]. A typical example in the encrypted database commu-
nity [13]–[18] is finding all matched records according to order
conditions such as indexed values or timestamps.
Over the past decade, the demand for designing range-based
indexes has been expected to be addressed by the innovation
of cryptographic techniques, e.g., order-preserving/revealing
encryption (OPE/ORE) schemes [19]–[28], which allow order
comparisons to be performed directly on ciphertexts. In prac-
tice, however, these schemes are developed as cryptographic
primitives and can hardly accommodate system-wise security
requirements [29]–[36]. Specifically, different queries reveal
the associations between the query tokens and the number of
return results (i.e., volume-pattern). An attacker can determine
the indexed value relations by observing the distribution of
the result size. Recent leakage-abuse attacks [29]–[31] have
shown how the volume-pattern leakage can be exploited to
learn sensitive information about the queries and outsourced
data. To mitigate this leakage concern, a simple approach is to
apply naive padding. However, this approach would introduce
expensive storage overhead because the result set of each index
entry is padded to the maximum length.
In the literature, only a few recent works [37]–[39] have
started to study practical index designs with the protection
of volume-pattern. In [37], Kamara et al. proposed the first
practical volume-hiding encryption scheme by using the multi-
map data structure [38]. The follow-up design [39] utilized
cuckoo hashing and differential privacy to further reduce the
volume and storage overhead. Unfortunately, neither of the
existing schemes can support volume-hiding range queries
because of two challenging issues. Firstly, unlike keyword
search functions, the result size of different range queries
cannot be pre-defined. Clients without pre-knowledge of the
result size have to download all the data in order to hide the
volume-pattern leakage, which demands a large amount of
bandwidth overhead. Secondly, the results (i.e., access-pattern)
of different range queries have multiple unique intersections,
which can be exploited for inferring the plaintext distribution.
For example, the result set associated with the endpoint values
must appear in all the other range query results. By observing
the intersections of different range query results, an attacker
can still learn the data distribution even if the volume-pattern
has been well-protected. Therefore, how to enable volume-
hiding range queries over encrypted indexes is still challenging
and remains to be fully explored.
In this paper, for the first time, we solve the problem of
volume-hiding range queries in the data outsourcing paradigm.
Our proposed hybrid index framework, called HybrIDX, can
effectively address the aforementioned challenges while being
efficient in supporting range queries. To achieve our design
goals on both security and usability, we propose to bring
together the advancement of both applied cryptography and
trusted hardware to build the desired index construction. To
hide the result size of different range queries, we first propose
to utilize the trusted enclave to securely convert any range
query with large result size into multiple independent sub-
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2020 IEEE 40th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)
2575-8411/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/ICDCS47774.2020.00014
2020 IEEE 40th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS) | 978-1-7281-7002-2/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE | DOI: 10.1109/ICDCS47774.2020.00014
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