FrodoPIR: Simple, Scalable, Single-Server Private
Information Retrieval
Alex Davidson, Gon¸calo Pestana, Sof´ıa Celi
Brave Software
Abstract. We design FrodoPIR — a highly configurable, stateful, single-
server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme that involves an of-
fline phase that is completely client-independent. Coupled with small
online overheads, it leads to much smaller amortized financial costs on
the server-side than previous approaches. In terms of performance for a
database of 1 million 1KB elements, FrodoPIR requires < 1 second for
responding to a client query, has a server response size blow-up factor
of < 3.6×, and financial costs are ∼ $1 for answering 100, 000 client
queries. Our experimental analysis is built upon a simple, non-optimized
Rust implementation, illustrating that FrodoPIR is particularly suitable
for deployments that involve large numbers of clients.
1 Introduction
A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme provides the ability for clients to
retrieve items from an online database, without revealing anything about their
queries to the untrusted host server(s). Applications of practical PIR schemes
include: anonymous communication [7, 61], anonymous media streaming [47],
privacy-preserving ad-delivery [45, 68, 63], private location discovery [37], pri-
vate contact discovery [16], password-checking [3], and SafeBrowsing [54]. PIR
schemes are split into those that are information-theoretically secure, but require
the database to be shared between multiple non-colluding servers [5, 26, 9, 11,
31, 10, 12, 75, 36, 35, 28, 40, 72, 58]; and those that are computationally-secure
against a single untrusted server [3, 31, 6, 21, 24, 38, 55, 56, 1, 64, 65, 62, 59].
Multi-server PIR constructions are typically more efficient than single-server
schemes. However, finding non-colluding servers to jointly fulfill the PIR func-
tionality can be unrealistic and burdensome. To avoid such problems, devel-
oping practical single-server PIR schemes is a desirable goal. The most effi-
cient single-server PIR schemes are based on fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE), with security derived from the ring learning with errors (RLWE) as-
sumption [1, 6, 62, 3, 64, 59]. Unfortunately, these schemes incur computational,
bandwidth, and consequent financial overheads for answering client queries on
standard, cloud-based infrastructure that would make them expensive to run at
scale. Even the most efficient require several seconds to process a single query
on a database of 1 million 1KB elements.
To drive down online and financial costs, a recent line of work of single-
server PIR moves large proportions of the expensive online computation and
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